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Abstract:  Woodruff’s target article provides a detailed review of comparative studies on brain 
and behavior in teleosts. However, the relevance of the scientific data to the question of 
consciousness rests solely on the validity of a small set of so-called "requirements for 
consciousness." I use the target article to demonstrate that the neuroscientific study of animal 
consciousness in general relies on external, highly questionable and unfalsifiable criteria, and 
therefore fails to resolve the question of which animal species are sentient. Fish behavior can be 
remarkably complex, but whether fish are conscious remains a matter of belief. 
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In a recent paper (Gutfreund 2017), I argued that scientific conclusions on consciousness in 
animals are mostly premature, and that given our current state of knowledge, neuroscientific 
data cannot help us resolve the question of animal consciousness, i.e., which animal species 
possess phenomenal consciousness or sentience. Woodruff’s (2017) target article is a good 
example to illustrate this point. 
The paper is divided into two parts: the first discusses the optic tectum, and the second the 
pallium. I will focus my comments on the first part. But the argument does not depend on a 
specific structure or behavior, and can therefore easily be generalized to the pallium as well as 
to publications about other species and brain structures.  
Woodruff begins his discussion of the tectum with the following statement: "The neural 
representation of the world in the tectum is experienced subjectively as mental images." Here is 
how Woodruff justifies this: "But what evidence is there that the optic tectum is a crucial part of 
such a neural system? Others, in particular Feinberg and Mallatt (2013, 2016) and Merker 
(2007), have provided extensive reviews of this evidence. I will not replicate these reviews, but 
will provide a brief account of data indicating that the optic tectum, and its extrinsic and 
intrinsic connections, meet the requirements to be an anatomical substrate of sentience in 
fishes." [See also Mallatt & Feinberg (2016) and Merker (2016) – ed.] 
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Woodruff then explains what these requirements are: the first is that the visual world is 
represented accurately in the tectum and the second is the modulation of primary sensory 
pathways by intrinsic excitatory and inhibitory interneurons. This is followed by a review of the 
data supporting the above two "requirements" in fish. Therefore, the scientific data presented 
in the target article are not evidence for the main conclusion that there is something it feels like 
to be a fish but evidence for the "requirements," i.e., for sensory representations and neural 
modulation in the fish tectum. Woodruff’s main conclusion rests on what seems to be axiomatic 
(and highly questionable) requirements. The question that is largely ignored in the paper is: 
what are the justifications for assuming that the requirements are indeed indicative of sentience 
in animals? I will now argue that the requirements are based on beliefs more than on scientific 
data, and since they are unfalsifiable, they fail to lead to progress. 
Take the first requirement as an example: "isomorphic representation of sensory input and 
segregation of the sensory modalities." (On a side note, in my opinion the claim of isomorphic 
representation in the tectum is questionable in itself. There is compelling evidence, mostly from 
birds but also from fish, that the output layers of the tectum only represent the locations of 
relevant targets for behavior, rather than providing an accurate representation of what is out 
there [Mysore and Knudsen, 2011, Dutta and Gutfreund, 2014].) However, for the sake of 
argument, we can assume that the fish tectum represents the external environment in an 
isomorphic manner.  
What reason is there to think that isomorphic representation is a criterion for sentience in 
fish? It is not in the biophysical properties of the neurons, it is not in the pathways from the 
sensory epithelium to the brain map, and it is not in the neural circuitry forming or modulating 
the representations. So what is left? The only reason to relate the mysterious property of 
consciousness to a sensory neural system representing the external environment is that we are 
aware of the world around us and therefore tend to relate consciousness to systems that 
represent the environment internally (metaphorically called mental images). I believe this same 
reason underlies all other suggested requirements for animal sentience: we are consciously 
aware of a unified coherent sensory space so we tend to relate consciousness to systems that 
integrate and bind sensory information. We are consciously aware of our declarative memories 
so we tend to relate consciousness to systems that demonstrate behavioral signatures of 
declarative memories, and so on. Consciousness in an animal is not inferred from what we know 
about its physics, chemistry or biology. At the moment, the only reason to justify inferring 
consciousness in an animal is that we are conscious. So the only way to resolve questions about 
consciousness in animals is by resolving our consciousness first. All the rest is 
anthropomorphism: if it behaves like me and has a brain with similarities to mine, it is likely to 
feel like me. This is an intuitive statement (and probably true) but it is not helpful because we 
are still faced with the unanswered question: how much like me does it need to be for it to be 
sentient? This is a different version of the original question of animal consciousness, taking us 
back to where we started. The lack of progress in resolving questions about consciousness in 
animals is the price to pay for ignoring the still existing explanatory gap between consciousness 
and behavior.  
 
Closing remark. Woodruff concludes his paper with a surprising comment: "Fish sentience 
differs from human sentience, and what it feels like is as unknowable to us as what it feels like 
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to be a bat." This comes as a surprise because much of the paper is an attempt to convince us 
that fish are sentient by showing how similar the organization of their brain and behavior is to 
those of mammals. The criteria for sentience are based on correlations to human sentience and 
so are the arguments in favor of the conclusions. So why is the final conclusion that fish 
sentience differs from that of humans? To me, this discrepancy is a sign that Woodruff admits 
somewhat the weaknesses of his evidence. The resemblance to humans is not the full story. 
There are also significant and meaningful anatomical, physiological and behavioral differences 
between conscious humans and fish. Since we do not know what the relationship between 
sentience and the brain or behavior is, it is equally possible that the differences dictate a 
sentience in fish that differs so much from that of humans that it cannot be called sentience 
anymore. The bottom line is that we do not know whether fish feel. The scientific evidence is 
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On November 17-18, 2017, the NYU Center for Mind, Brain and 
Consciousness, the NYU Center for Bioethics, and NYU Animal Studies will 
host a conference on Animal Consciousness. 
 
This conference will bring together philosophers and scientists to discuss 
questions such as: Are invertebrates conscious? Do fish feel pain? Are non-
human mammals self-conscious? How did consciousness evolve? How does 
research on animal consciousness affect the ethical treatment of animals? What 
is the impact of issues about animal consciousness on theories of consciousness 




Speakers and panelists include: 
  
Colin Allen (University of Pittsburgh, Department of History & Philosophy of 
Science), Andrew Barron (Macquarie, Cognitive Neuroethology),  
Victoria Braithwaite (Penn State, Biology), Peter Carruthers (Maryland, 
Philosophy), Marian Dawkins (Oxford, Zoology), Dan Dennett (Tufts, 
Philosophy), David Edelman (San Diego, Neuroscience),  
Todd Feinberg (Mt. Sinai, Neurology), Peter Godfey-Smith (Sydney, 
Philosophy), Lori Gruen (Wesleyan, Philosophy), Brian Hare (Duke, Evolutionary 
Anthropology), Stevan Harnad (Montreal, Cognitive Science), Eva Jablonka (Tel 
Aviv, Cohn Institute), Björn Merker (Neuroscience), Diana Reiss (Hunter, 
Psychology), Peter Singer (Princeton, Philosophy), Michael Tye (Texas, Philosophy) 
 
 
Organizers: Ned Block, David Chalmers, Dale Jamieson, S. Matthew Liao. 
 
The conference will run from 9am on Friday November 17 to 6pm on Saturday November 18 at the NYU Cantor Film Center (36 E 
8th St).  
 
Friday sessions will include “Invertebrates and the evolution of consciousness”, “Do fish feel pain?”, and “Animal consciousness 
and ethics”.  
 
Saturday sessions will include “Animal self-consciousness”, “Animal consciousness and theories of consciousness”, and a panel 
discussion.  
 
A detailed schedule will be circulated closer to the conference date. 
 
Registration is free but required.  
 
Register here.  
 
See also the conference website. 
 
 
